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Defence of an Independent Scotland

by Stuart Crawford

With the Scottish Parliament a reality and constitutional strains between Edinburgh and London already showing, the powers reserved by Westminster under the Scotland Act are coming under ever closer scrutiny. One these reserved powers is defence policy, and when talk turns to Scottish independence - which many commentators now see as inevitable - the question is often asked: could an independent Scotland manage its own armed forces?

With a Westminster General Election possibly only 9 months away, now is an appropriate time to examine how an independent Scotland might organise its military establishment. The first question is whether Scotland, with no obvious natural predators, would need armed forces at all. Arguably, the military threat to an independent Scotland is likely to be limited to infringements of coastal integrity and security of oil rigs. We must be clear, therefore, on what armed forces are for. David Chuter of the Centre for Defence Studies recently suggested the following answers.

Firstly, armed forces are required to ensure the survival of the state against internal enemies - the state's "ultimate argument". Secondly, armed forces guard the state against external aggressors, and act as "the political affirmation of sovereignty and identity which results from a visible determination to define and patrol frontiers and areas of interest with military forces". The third function of armed forces is to promote stability in regions of the globe where a state has political, economic, or strategic interests. This does not necessarily mean the despatch of military forces. Political ends can be achieved by low-level military assistance and military diplomacy, the latter a traditional role of the visiting warship in a foreign port.

Beyond these three reasons the use of armed forces becomes largely a matter of choice. Use of armed forces in voluntary ventures like peacekeeping can gain a state a "seat at the conference table" when international matters are debated or resolved. All of these purposes are relevant to independent Scotland. How might Scotland constitute, organise, and deploy its forces? All the essential elements are already present. Scotland contributes more than its fair share of personnel to the British Services; roughly 10% of the Royal Navy, 12% of the Army, and 13% of the Royal Air Force is Scots.

Manpower, therefore, is unlikely to be a problem. Much of the military infrastructure is already in place; there are naval bases at Faslane and Rosyth, barracks in Edinburgh, Fort George, and a host of others places, and air force bases at Leuchars, Lossiemouth, and Kinloss. There are training areas, ranges, and other facilities a-plenty. And there are the headquarters and communications facilities for command and control. Defence policy would probably be implemented by a joint headquarters sitting at the political/military interface, perhaps in the form of a Department of Defence with a joint headquarters for the armed forces directly below it. Thereafter naval, land, and air forces would be commanded via the appropriate chains of command.

Much emphasis from the outset would undoubtedly be placed on "jointery", whereby close liaison between navy, army, and air force avoids the unnecessary duplication of effort and resources which plague the military establishments of other nations. In short, Scotland has the personnel, expertise, and infrastructure to raise its own armed services. No credible military commentator would say otherwise.

The question is no longer one of could Scotland have its own military forces but rather should it. Inevitably, the major argument against is the economic one, with Unionist politicians stating that an independent Scotland simply couldn't afford to defend itself. But, with oil revenues on independence going into the Edinburgh Treasury, allied to a much more modest defence policy which avoids the expenses of nuclear weaponry and overseas garrisons, such arguments are looking increasingly shaky.

© S W Crawford 2000

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